On March 6, 2024, there appeared in Foreign Affairs a noteworthy article. Penned by four authors (Max Bergmann, Michael Kimmage, Jeffrey Mankoff, and Maria Snegovaya), the article is titled “America’s New Twilight Struggle with Russia: To Prevail, Washington Must Revive Containment.”
As the article’s title makes clear, the authors are calling on the U.S. to return, in its relations with today’s Russian Federation, to essentially the same multi-faceted (and costly) global strategy of resistance to the USSR that was recommended, back in 1947, by George Kennan.
Whatever its possible weaknesses, such a policy has at least the clear benefit of not requiring fundamental changes in how anyone thinks about international politics — one is almost tempted to say that the proposal doesn’t require thought tout court. Western military alliances, Western think tanks, Western politicians, can simply let inertia continue to carry them forward, and as they do so, carry along with them the rest of the world.
Will that be a good thing, however — for us, for the world at large? In an effort to mount a serious response to this enormously consequential question, we put out an appeal to our associated scholars and friends of the Simone Weil Center. Over the coming weeks, we will be publishing their responses in Landmarks.
Paul Grenier
New Containment: More NATO Expansion by Another Name
April 01, 2024
By GORDON M. HAHN*
A new proposal in Foreign Affairs offers us just more of the same failed policies towards Russia.
The proposal for a “new American twilight struggle with Russia” and a “new containment” policy which recently appeared in Foreign Affairs offers us nothing more than a continuation of the policy that has already led to the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War – NATO expansion. The co-authors are in effect calling on the West to double, triple, and quadruple down on stupid on an even grander scale.
After all, what, in effect if not intent, has been the policy of NATO expansion right up to Russia’s borders? Answer: a de facto ‘New Containment.’ The ‘post-Cold War’ New Containment based on NATO expansion and the attendant policies employed in order to achieve it – democracy-promotion, colour revolutions, economic sanctions, the arming and equipping of Islamist and nationalist extremists in ‘target countries’ – led directly to the ‘New Cold War,’ as well as to the ongoing NATO-Russia Ukrainian War, and a series of preceding wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Georgia, Libya, and Syria. Now four Foreign Affairs authors are proposing an extension and expansion of post-Cold War New Containment in what will be the creation of global Containment 2.0 motivated once again by the pursuit of a now elusive American hegemony and the quest for total security by way of NATO expansion (or ‘integration into Western institutions’) and another escalation of the New Cold War.
Containment 2.0’s geography, according to the authors’ concept, marks “the most important difference” from Containment 1.0, under which NATO was the lead mechanism. New containment’s geography should not encompass Europe “primarily,” as the old containment did. Instead, “post-Soviet Eurasia and the rest of the world will be more central.” In other words, as its focus, the West’s Containment 2.0 should substitute Europe with all of Eurasia, in reality Great Eurasia — MacKinder’s “World Island” — stretching east-west from China to the English Channel, and north-southfrom the Indian Ocean to the Arctic. The entire globe becomes the outer concentric circle of the core area of interest and a secondary area of economic, political, developmental (colour revolution/democracy-promotion), intelligence, and military operations. The key “flash points” are located along “Russia’s western periphery” as they have been ever since NATO began to expand after the Cold War. The West should work on integrating “Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine” (GUAM becomes GUAAM) into “Western institutions” – i.e. NATO (and the EU) – while “checking Russian influence in Central Asia” (and Africa).
Outside Eurasia, the authors recommend military action to “contest Russian influence outside Europe” as a secondary strategy. There, Containment 2.0 should “primarily” deploy “development assistance, trade, and investment.” Thus, a West that is less robust and dominant economically than when it inaugurated Kennan’s Containment 1.0 in the post-World War II years will be expanding its sphere of ‘vital’ interests or domination to the entire globe, thereby expending even greater financial and military resources. This is being recommended in the aftermath of what is emerging as a failed effort to expand its domination to Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine, sparking wars and chaos in the bargain. Although this expansion and overextension would be merely making explicit and declared what has already been the implicit and undeclared policy in Washington, London, and Brussels since the Cold War’s end, it suggests a more intensive effort in its geographical, operational, financial, and budgetary dimensions.
The authors are aware that the international context of the New and Old Containments differ, but they are not aware enough. They note that just as during the First Cold War, the West will face off in the Second Cold War against not just Russia but also China as well. But they pass over the facts that China is far more powerful economically than the USSR was, that there is no Sino-Soviet rift offering opportunities for peeling one of them off from their tight geopolitical near-alliance, and that China and Russia are proving far more adept than were Russian and Chinese communists at rallying powerful states in vitally important regions such as the Middle East and the Arab and Muslim worlds and indeed elsewhere across the world’s continents. BRICS+ is never mentioned, nor is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Yet the former has attracted three Middle Eastern states that the authors hope to rely on in the region. Most disturbingly, the authors also fail to note or consider important that a fundamental “novelty of the present moment” compared with the onset of the First Cold War and Containment 1.0 is that today NATO is already deeply involved in – is effectively a combatant-party – in a European war against Containment’s target.
What will be the mechanisms to implement Containment 2.0? One can be sure that one, if not the leading one will be that very same NATO at war with Russia in Ukraine. A return to and expansion of ‘out-of-area operations’ will be ensured, and the transformation of NATO into a global rather than a European military alliance is all but certain. The opening of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization office in Japan was the first toll of that bell. Cooperation between NATO, AUKUS and QUAD will grow and be subject to being parlayed into the formation of a global NATO by some other name. NATO expansion’s internal logic of eternal expansion – the need to secure new, newer, and newest ‘flanks’ – will be locked in as a result of the proposed Containment 2.0.
The authors’ policy would mean the West would eschew seeking a modus vivendi, a mutually acceptable security architecture with Russia or any agreement regarding Ukraine. This proposal demonstrates that many in Washington intend to persist in expanding NATO “irrespective of how the war in Ukraine ends.” Indeed, the authors think that “even if Ukraine does not achieve total victory on the battlefield, it could nevertheless be integrated militarily and politically with the West”! Pursuit of a Containment 2.0 will lock in confrontation and likely also further military conflict with Russia, whether through proxies or otherwise, and so perhaps with China as well. Of particular importance is another result that follows from the authors’ typical, for Washington, lack of self-awareness. They ignore that the project of insisting on NATO expansion to Russia’s borders, a project which was pursued for over a quarter of a century, revived what is typically called ‘Russian paranoia,’ but what is in reality a quite rational security vigilance strain in Russia’s strategic and political culture in respect to the West.
Historically, divisive cultural and political influences, interference in Russia’s domestic affairs, interventions of various sorts, and numerous military invasions from the West have taught Russians to distrust the very West they have often sought to emulate. The post-Cold War era has seen this pattern repeat, with the revival and renewed dominance of Russia’s traditional security vigilance culture vis-a-vis the West after having gone through a period, during perestroika and the post-perestroika 1990s, when Russia’s traditional security culture had receded into the background. This is the result of the West having rejected the path of a strong, not open-ended but sufficient, American and Western security order enveloped in a balanced global security architecture.
The West’s relentless post-Cold war pursuit of a ‘new world order’ of maximal American power, dominance, and hegemony across the globe has its very own emblem: it is the emblem of NATO. Intensifying NATO expansion in the form of Containment 2.0 will exacerbate these trends, entailing still more escalation in the relationship as Russians become even more convinced that the rationale of their security vigilance norm vis-à-vis the West is the correct path, even a special Russian calling. This will inspire a new, even an official state ideology in Russia and perhaps elsewhere that will be anchored in animosity toward the West. In the West itself, the escalating, already partly hot New Cold War will lead to further enlargement and authoritarianization under the national security state.
The Containment 2.0 proposal further confirms my own suspicions that the slogan ‘long war’ in relation to the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War is the product of the aspirations among certain elements in Washington that the Ukrainian war be dragged out, because this is to the West’s advantage. Regardless of the risks of escalation, they believe the West must prolong some form of armed resistance to Russia in Ukraine. Indeed, as the authors put it, “Containment should be implemented “for as long as necessary,”[emphasis mine – GH] and “Ukrainian victory” is “a long-term goal.” They appear to define ‘victory’ as “(f)orcing Russia to abandon all or most of the territory it has occupied.” But the authors propose no new specific strategies or tactics for how to defeat Russia in Ukraine or how to “push the Russian threat farther from Europe’s borders” – other, that is, than by sending insufficient military aid packets from Europe of $50 billion and the still-unapproved American packet of $60 billion. This means continuing the war ‘to the last Ukrainian’ for as long as it takes for Russian forces to reach the Polish border. After Kiev’s defeat in conventional war, it will require proceeding to build and sustain a partisan insurgency movement in any post-war pro-Russian or occupied Ukraine or rump neutral Ukraine.
The long war is designed not only for the domestic political purpose of holding off a full collapse of the Ukrainian front until America’s November election. No, this next ‘twilight struggle’ must last as long as it takes to achieve ‘regime change’ in ‘Putin’s Russia,’ or, failing that, the West’s hoped for succession crisis in Russia could provide another opening for making good on the West’s ‘right’ to expand NATO to Ukraine and beyond.
*Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., gordonhahn.com, Expert Analyst at Corr Analytics, http://www.canalyt.com, Senior Researcher at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, http://www.cetisresearch.org. Author of five books on Russian and Eurasian Politics.
Source: https://landmarksmag.substack.com/p/new-containment-more-nato-expansion
If History is any Guide, ‘Containment 2.0’ May Become Another Bloody Debacle for the West
April 03, 2024
By PAUL ROBINSON*
By pursuing a strategy that is both brutal and underhanded, the West is likely to undermine the very values it is attempting to promote.
There is an interesting line in Bergman, Kimmage, Mankoff, and Snegovaya’s article ‘America’s New Twilight Struggle with Russia,’ in which the authors talk of ‘checking Russian influence in Central Asia and Africa.’ The distance between the United States and Kazakhstan is about 6,500 miles. The distance between Russia and Kazakhstan is zero, as the two are neighbours. Yet for some strange reason, it is considered quite natural that the United States should seek to dominate a region 6,500 miles from its shores, whereas ‘Russian influence’ right on its own borders is deemed a threat that must somehow be contained.
This example aptly illustrates what one might consider the extreme self-centeredness of the call for a new policy of containment. The idea that other states might have legitimate interests, even next to their homes, is entirely absent, while the interests of the United States are deemed to span the entire globe. Moreover, it is taken for granted that American assistance is something that all people desire, that it is for the good of all, and moreover that it will inevitably produce positive outcomes for all concerned, other, of course, than a few malign actors. The fact that others might have different ideas, or that American assistance might actually be harmful rather than helpful is not considered. What is good for us is good for them.
The experience of containment in the Cold War tells a rather different story. Containment sounds like a relatively benign, peaceful strategy compared with ‘rollback,’ the alternative of the time that envisioned actively pushing communism back from its existing boundaries. In reality, containment was an extremely bloody affair. The war in Vietnam was possibly the most extreme example, but bloodshed followed containment almost everywhere outside Europe. The massacres in Indonesia in 1965-66, for instance, probably claimed the lives of about half a million people. Proxy wars backed by the United States in countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands (perhaps even millions) more. It is hardly an experience that one would wish to repeat.Subscribe
To be fair, Bergmann et al. do admit that containment came with ‘abuses.’ They argue that outside of Europe, Containment 2.0 should rely not on military intervention but on economic and political assistance. But it is clear that the impetus for their proposal comes from the war in Ukraine and that in that instance their focus is, in fact, military. As they write: ‘that strategy should retain Ukrainian victory as a long-term goal. Forcing Russia to abandon all or most of the territory it has occupied there will push the Russian threat further from Europe’s borders … a Ukrainian military victory will require larger and more sustained Western military assistance.’
Interestingly, the stated aim here is not actually containment but rollback – ‘forcing Russian to abandon all or most of the territory it has occupied.’ This is an extremely ambitious program, and even if were achievable it could not be achieved without a very long war that would cost the lives of an extremely large number of people (including, of course, Ukrainians), as well as the wholesale destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure. Containment 2.0 is a recipe for prolonged and bloody war.
It’s also unlikely to succeed. War is full of uncertainty, so one can never tell for sure, but as things stand, the prospects of Ukraine recapturing most, or all, of its lost territory seem very low. Pursuing that goal will lead not merely to death and destruction, but to futile death and destruction.
This doesn’t seem to bother the new Cold Warriors. Convinced that they are ‘helping’ Ukraine, they lead it further into the abyss, just as their predecessors led Vietnamese, Afghans, Angolans, and others into the abyss in decades past.
Looking at this from a philosophical point of view, one might complain that the issue here is a failure to follow Kant’s categorical imperative and to view people as ends in themselves rather than a means to an end. The end is weakening Russia and China, and if others suffer in the process, we shrug our shoulders and consider it a price worth paying, knowing full well that it is not us but others who are paying the price.
I think, though, that this complaint is not entirely accurate because the architects of these policies strike me not so much as cynics who know full well what they are doing but as true believers, who really imagine that their ‘help’ is in fact help, that the United States is a force for good in the world, and that spreading its influence and undermining that of others is thus for the benefit of all humanity.
This comes through in the talk of ‘support for governance reform and trade’ and of countering ‘Russian influence outside Europe primarily through development assistance, trade, and investment.’
The first thing to note about this is that it is not nearly as new as the authors would like readers to think it is. Development assistance, trade, and investment were key aspects of Cold War-era containment. From the mid-1950s, for instance, the United States invested heavily in southern Afghanistan, through projects such as the Helmand Valley Authority. Other developing countries were similar recipients of American aid. This built on modernization theory, developed by the likes of Eugene Staley and Walt Rostow, who imagined that one could export the experience of the American New Deal to Africa and Central Asia, enable local economies to ‘take off,’ build a liberal civil society, and at the end of it all save the recipients of US aid from communism.
It generally didn’t end well. US-backed irrigation projects in the Helmand Valley, for instance, left it not a blooming garden but a salty desert (I exaggerate a bit, but it is generally agreed that the results were not very positive). Similar outcomes appeared elsewhere.
Unfortunately, the world is littered with failed development assistance projects. If Bergmann et al., imagine that the United State has gotten better at this since the Cold War, they should read the reports of the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, which provide excruciating details of billions of dollars squandered on failed, and often counterproductive, aid projects in the years between 2001 and 2021. The U.S. and its allies imagined that they were helping Afghanistan, but their aid just made things worse. It is a recurring pattern. If I truly believed that the U.S. and its allies really knew what they were doing when it came to development assistance, support for good governance, and the like, I might support it. But the evidence suggests rather the opposite.
Beyond this, one gets no sense from Bergmann et al. that people in outside Europe might not want American assistance or might not regard American models of development as appropriate for their circumstances. Their article speaks of the ‘brutality and corruption of Russian-backed juntas,’ by which one imagines they have in mind the military governments that have recently taken over countries such as Niger. But there is a reason why these ‘juntas’ seized power and seem to enjoy some popular support, and that is that their predecessors were themselves corrupt and incompetent. And if the Russians also enjoy some popular support in parts of Africa (as seems to be the case), it is because the Western backers of the previous regimes had become thoroughly disliked.
If Africans in some instances choose to prefer Russia over America, France, or Britain (a choice possibly partly determined by memories of colonialism and the Soviet Union’s support of national liberation struggles), who are we to tell them that they must do otherwise? There is, it seems to me, a profound arrogance to this approach, as well as unwillingness to consider that others might legitimately view things differently and have a right to go their own way.
At this point, it is perhaps necessary also to express what some might consider a somewhat cynical view about the expressed intent to promote U.S. interests by ‘supporting locally led initiatives to foster civil society.’ Superficially, it sounds totally benign. Dig a bit deeper, though, and there are grounds for concern.
In its broadest definition, civil society includes any organization operating outside the purview of the state, from the local knitting club upwards. In the meaning more often used by Western politicians, in the context of countries they do not like, civil society is a much narrower concept. It is more strictly a Westernizing, liberal civil society. The term civil society thus refers to that segment of society that is politically opposed to the ruling regime, wishes to advance Western understandings of democracy and human rights, align its country more closely politically with the West, and more generally Westernize that country’s institutions and values. As such it is often at odds with much of the surrounding population. Western support for it can prove deeply destabilizing, particularly when civil society of such a sort succeeds in taking power against the wishes of important segments of the population, leading to a backlash and in the worst circumstances civil war. This is more or less what happened in Ukraine in 2014. Beyond that, overt Western support for this kind of civil society may have the effect of tainting it in the eyes of the authorities, resulting in its suppression. This can be seen in Russia, where the association of liberal civil society with the West has arguably had the effect of persuading the state that it is a fifth column being promoted by the West to undermine the state from within. By promoting democracy and liberal values in such a way, Western states can inadvertently undermine it.
The repeated failures not only of military intervention but also of development assistance, democracy promotion, and the like, never seems to stop Western liberal internationalists from wanting to do the same thing all over again. This reveals another serious deficiency – a lack of self-awareness. Such is our certainty that we are the ‘good guys’ that we seem all too often to be incapable of understanding that our record does not match our expressed intention and that others might therefore have very good reason to view us as a danger. When, for instance, Russians say that they view NATO expansion as a threat, they are dismissed as talking nonsense. In our minds, we know that NATO is purely defensive. If others think something different, they are wrong, and should therefore be ignored. But it doesn’t actually matter if they are wrong. If that is how they will think, it will affect their behaviour, and it must therefore be taken into consideration.
Take, for instance, the article under discussion. How do the authors imagine it will be received in Moscow or Beijing? Do they imagine that people there will somehow reconsider their actions? Or is it more likely that on reading it, even sceptics will conclude that their leaders are right, that the West is out to get them, and that they must therefore resist? I suspect that the latter answer is more likely. If so, Containment 2.0 is likely to prove deeply counterproductive.
*Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He has written numerous works on Russian history, military affairs, and international politics.
Source: https://landmarksmag.substack.com/p/if-history-is-any-guide-containment
The New Cold War’s Second Wind
April 03, 2024
Foreign Affairs’ latest attempt to revive the worst aspects of the Cold War is an exercise in propaganda, not elucidation.
The specter of Trump II haunts the dreams of those who look back on the first Cold War and see not the terror of the Cuba Missile Crisis; the bloodletting of Vietnam; the move to DEFCON III in 1973; or the nuclear false alarms of the Carter and Reagan eras. Rather, they see a halcyon era wherein the US, led by a wise bipartisan establishment, weathered the storm thanks to the wise and patient application of the containment doctrine.
To their barely concealed dismay, they realize that the years-long 100 billion dollar plus effort at propping up an authoritarian kleptocracy centered in Kiev is indeed flailing: The money is running out, and popular (as well as political) support for the venture is on a downward trend. They see in Trump (wrongly, I happen to think) an existential threat to America’s proxy war in Ukraine and so, the administration and the US establishment are desperately trying to create a renewed sense of urgency regarding the Ukrainian war effort. Their project now needs, above all, a second wind, and reinvigoration requires invention.
Once upon a time Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whose ideological progeny now stalk the corridors of power in Joe Biden’s Washington, advised President Truman that the public case for the Truman Doctrine had to be “clearer than truth,” or, put another way, not true at all.
Having been debased by the decade-long editorship of Gideon Rose, the once august journal Foreign Affairs staggers along – a zombie from another time. But it maintains its uses to the established order. And one of its principle uses is to provide intellectual justification for the unjustifiable. It wouldn’t be the first time. By the late 1940s, the American people were exhausted and war weary. A second wind was needed and the threat of a monolithic Communist threat provided the oxygen. George F. Kennan’s 1947 “X” article in the same journal served a similar purpose for the first Cold War, not dissimilar to Winston Churchill’s anti-communist clarion call in Fulton, Missouri the year before.
Kennan was brilliant, but he was also occasionally hysterical. And cooler heads, such as Walter Lippmann, realized that the “X” strategy condemned us to an unnecessarily drawn out and dangerous Cold War. As Lippmann biographer Ronald Steele points out,
…To confront the Soviets at “every point where they show signs of encroaching” was, Lippmann charged, a “strategic monstrosity” doomed to fail. It could be attempted only by “recruiting, subsidizing, and supporting a heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents, and puppets.” Propping up anticommunist regimes around the periphery of the Soviet Union would require unending American intervention.”
To Kennan’s great credit he soon came to realize that containment abetted militarization and presented militarists in government like Acheson, Paul Nitze, Frank Wisner, Allen and John Foster Dulles and many others besides, an intellectual and strategic framework to do their worst. Which they did.
The March 2024 issues of Foreign Affairs is once again playing its part – and while the dramatis personae are different, the story remains much the same. Which brings us, alas, to the article in question: “America’s New Twilight Struggle With Russia” by Max Bergmann, Michael Kimmage, Jeffrey Mankoff, and Maria Snegovaya. The first tip-off that the article’s purpose is to propagandize rather than inform is the presence of Bergmann on the byline. Bergmann, before ascending to his current perch at CSIS, worked under the shameless Clinton partisan Neera Tanden at John Podesta’s Center for American Progress where he directed a Neo-McCarthyite “Moscow Project,” one of the more unhinged products of an unhinged time.
The four (!) authors argue for the broadest possible application of the containment doctrine in the most alarmist terms (“clearer than truth”). “Kennan’s vision of containment focused primarily on Europe,” they write. “Today, post-Soviet Eurasia and the rest of the world will be more central.” [Emphasis mine].
We are further told, “Ukraine’s defense is crucial for European stability and for preventing the spread of Russian power globally.” And still more, “Containing Russia in Ukraine means keeping the line of contact as close to the Russian border as possible, constraining Russia’s expansionist tendencies.” In other words, we are supposed to believe that a carve-out of Novorossiya presages an attempt by Russia to expand globally? The authors fail to note that Russia’s 2024 defense budget, at $109 billion, is roughly ten times less than US defense expenditures and ten times less than NATO defense spending. Where are they going to expand to?Transnistria?
In the authors’ telling, Containment 2.0 will differ from the original through its steady application of American power throughout Asia. As they put it, “Any strategy for containing Russia must account for resource commitments to the Indo-Pacific and for the impact of U.S. policy on the Chinese-Russian relationship.” What they fail to acknowledge is that this has already been tried before – and the results did not redound to the benefit of the United States. The original iteration of containment, along with Paul Nitze’s militarization of it (though his authorship, in 1950, of NSC-68) set the stage for the ‘Domino theory’ which in turn begat Vietnam. I can confidently assume that at least two of the four authors are fully aware of this, but the purpose of the exercise, as I said, is propaganda not elucidation.
Withal, it never seems to occur to the authors that the war and its continuation hinge on one issue and one issue alone: NATO: No NATO, no war. Ukrainian neutrality was and remains the key to unravelling the Gordian knot. But recognizing this would require the authors to surrender their collective dream of a new Cold War in which they can play the part of architect, of grand strategist, of hero.
In the end, the New Cold War needed a second wind and Foreign Affairs answered the call.
Just like old times.
Source: https://landmarksmag.substack.com/p/the-new-cold-wars-second-wind
Containment 2.0 Makes the U.S. Resemble the Very Thing it Claimed to be Fighting During the Cold War
April 06, 2024
By VICTOR TAKI*
It has become customary in certain quarters to contrast the current international imbroglio to the good old days of the Cold War: in comparison with the present-day protagonists, the two superpowers of yore might indeed appear as paragons of self-restraint. By the same token one might be tempted to contrast George Kennan’s foreign political wisdom to the collective folly of the mainstream media experts in the West. However, I would emphasize the continuity.
Late in his life, Kennan was a rare voice of caution advising the Clinton administration against the first post-1991 round of NATO expansion, yet his “Long Telegram” never really impressed me as a fair description of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. The following words in particular strike me as a fundamental misperception: “[We] have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.”
This misperception reflected a profound difference of political cultures of the two countries shaped by very different historical experiences and geographic conditions. Despite its initial parochialism, post-Petrine Russia ultimately became an integral part of European great power politics. Both in its pre-1789 “balance of power” variant, and in its post-1815 “Concert of Europe” version, this great power politics was nothing other than a modus vivendi of a handful of states whose rulers for all practical purposes abandoned the hope of imposing their will (rules, norms) on the rivals. Two centuries of this historical experience produced among Russian elites a notion of great power equality that was strong enough to prevail over the early Soviet revolutionary messianism and become a defining characteristic of both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. It stood behind the Soviet interest in “peaceful co-existence of the two systems,” just as it informs present-day Moscow’s rhetoric of “indivisible security.”
It is precisely this notion of great power equality that the American political establishment never accepted, as is clear (among other things) from both Kennan’s initial concept of containment and the current attempts to revive it. The basic reasons for this are easy enough to see. Unlike Russia, the United States has never been part of the European balance of power or the European Concert. In a century of self-chosen isolationism, they turned from a country, which had been smaller and weaker than a European great power, into a country that eclipsed all of them by its economic and ultimately military might. In itself, this difference of scale and potential is not a barrier to the development of a modus vivendi mentality – the powers that balanced each other in Europe were after all vastly different in terms of territory, population, wealth, etc. However, the discrepancy in scale was further enhanced by a highly advantageous geographic position of the United States and a messianic collective psychology that has its roots in the Calvinist concept of double predestination. As a result, American foreign policy makers have been quite insensitive to Moscow’s post-1945 security concerns and, at the same time, tempted to exploit its strategic vulnerabilities.
Decades of Cold War “containment” have manifestly failed to make Russian elites abandon their great power mentality, yet this policy may still succeed in making the Russian perception of the United States similar to Kennan’s initial (mis)perception of the post-WWII Soviet Union. In fact, the Foreign Affairs proposal for a new containment may stimulate the Russian leadership to conclude that “we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with us there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if American power is to be secure.” Once the master of the Kremlin makes this conclusion, the authors of “new containment” may rightfully celebrate an important step forward in their efforts to reshape the world in America’s image, yet will the world become a safer place?
| *Victor Taki : I am a historian interested in imperial Russia’s Balkan entanglements and the intellectual history of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. My latest book Russia’s Turkish Wars was published by the University of Toronto Press in 2024. |
Source: https://landmarksmag.substack.com/p/containment-20-makes-the-us-resemble
Emma Olive 